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The California Supreme Court
Hearings - A Tragedy That
Should and Could Have Been
Avoided
By JAMES DUKE CAMERON*
Introduction
California has led the way, through its constitution,1 in the
creation of an effective judicial discipline commission. With some
exceptions, the California procedures are similar to those adopted
by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. 2 Thus
it is ironic that California should also provide us with an example
of how not to respond to widely publicized charges of alleged mis-
conduct against members of its highest court. Admittedly, there
should be an adequate response to public allegations of misconduct
on the part of the judiciary.$ But the fact that such allegations are
of great public interest does not justify a departure from estab-
lished and accepted methods of investigating asserted judicial mis-
conduct. Once a method of investigating and evaluating charges of
misconduct has been provided, these procedures should be fol-
* Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; Co-chairman of the American Bar Association Joint
Committee on Professional Discipline; B.A., 1950, University of California, Berkeley; J.D.,
1954, University of Arizona College of the Law.
1. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (1879, amended 1976). See Frankel, What's in a Name? -
California Sets the Style, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 189 (1966).
2. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR
LAwYERS AND JUDGES (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA Standards]. Subsequent reference to
the ABA Standards will be to Part 1, Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disa-
bility Retirement, approved by the House of Delegates in February 1978.
3. "The public has an indisputable interest in those who preside in its courtrooms. It
also has suspicions about courts and judges which will not be allayed by judicial reluctance
to submit to visible disciplinary proceedings." Peskoe, Procedures for Judicial Discipline:
Type of Commission, Due Process & Right to Counsel, 54 CHL-KENT L. REv. 147, 147
(1977).
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lowed scrupulously. The fiasco in California was, for the most part,
the result of the failure of the California Judicial Council and the
California Commission on Judicial Performance to follow well-
traveled roads pioneered by the State of California and recognized
by most states today.4
This article will consider four questions concerning the inves-
tigation of the California Supreme Court by the California Com-
mission on Judicial Performance:
1. Were the allegations, if true, grounds for judicial
discipline?
2. Should the hearings have been open to the public?
3. Should the internal deliberative processes of the court
have been the subject of investigation?
4. Should the Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline
and Disability Retirement be amended to provide pub-
lic funds for the defense of judges when they are re-
quired to defend themselves in a judicial discipline
proceeding?
The Factual Background5
Rose Elizabeth Bird was selected by Governor Jerry Brown, on
March 26, 1977, to be Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court. A newly appointed justice or chief justice of the state su-
preme court must stand for retention at the next regular election,
so that the voters may decide whether the justice should remain in
office.' Chief Justice Bird's appointment provided considerable
controversy, and formal, as well as formidable, opposition ap-
peared in the form of a law and order campaign committee led by
State Senator H. L. Richardson. The committee's stated aim was
to raise over one million dollars to defeat Chief Justice Bird and
Associate Justice Frank C. Newman in the fall election. By August
1978, a second group was formed and designated the "No On Bird
Committee." This committee hoped to raise between five hundred
4. Forty-nine states and fifty-one jurisdictions, if the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico are included, have some form of judicial conduct commission.
5. I am indebted to Teresa Tan and Alexander B. Aikman of the Western Regional
Office of the National Center for State Courts for their excellent article on the factual back-
ground of the California Supreme Court hearings. Tan & Aikman, California Supreme
Court Investigation, 4 STATE COURT J. 3 (1980).
6. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(d) (1849, amended 1974).
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and seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars for its campaign
against the chief justice. The amount of money actually raised is
not known, but sufficient funds were gathered to subject the voters
of California to an emotional media campaign which questioned
prior decisions of the court and urged a "no" vote for Chief Justice
Bird, as well as Justice Newman. As the election drew near, the
chief justice became the primary target of the campaign.
Against this background-a chief justice fighting for her politi-
cal life-two controversial cases, People v. Tanne and Fox v. City
of Los Angeles,8 came before the California Supreme Court. People
v. Tanner involved the California "use a gun, go to prison" statute,
while Fox v. City of Los Angeles concerned the legality of the City
of Los Angeles' placing a lighted cross on top of City Hall during
the Christmas season. As election day neared, these cases were still
before the court. On election day, the Los Angeles Times, in a lead
article, stated: "The California Supreme Court has decided to
overturn a 1975 law that required prison terms for persons who
used a gun during a violent crime, but has not made the decision
public. . . ."I The article reported that the vote was four to three
with Chief Justice Bird being among the majority.10 In the elec-
tion, the chief justice was retained by only fifty-two percent of the
vote, the smallest margin by which any justic6 in California has
ever won retention. It is not over-speculative to conclude that had
the court decided and released the Tanner and Fox opinions11
before the election, Chief Justice Bird could well have been
defeated.
Because of the allegations made by the press, the chief justice,
on November 24, 1978, publicly requested that the Commission on
Judicial Performance conduct an investigation of the charges of
7. 23 Cal. 3d 16, 587 P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978), rehearing granted, 24 Cal.
3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
8. 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
9. L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 3 quoted in Tan & Aikman, supra note 5, at 4.
10. The article was correct in stating that the opinion, handed down on December 22,
1978, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Basically the Supreme Court held that the
mandatory provisions of the "use a gun, go to prison" law were not applicable when the trial
judge wished to set the gun use provision aside and give the defendant probation.
11. The Fox opinion was handed down on December 15, 1978, and held that the City
of Los Angeles could not display a lighted cross on City Hall during the Christmas season.
22 Cal. 3d at 794, 587 P.2d at 664, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 868. Justice Newman wrote the opinion
for the court, and the chief justice filed a concurring opinion. Justices Clark and Richardson
dissented.
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delay, suggesting the issuance of a public report and offering her
full cooperation. In response to this request, the California Judicial
Council adopted a resolution providing:
that the request of the Chief Justice that there be "an investiga-
tion of the charges that the Supreme Court improperly deferred
announcing a decision in the Tanner case" by the Commission on
Judicial Performance be acknowledged as action taken by her in
her capacity as Chief Justice .... [and] ... that the designation
of the Commission on Judicial Performance as the body to con-
duct that investigation be approved. 12
A special rule dispensing with the California constitutional re-
quirement for confidentiality provided that all segments of the
news media could "be present and report."13 However, the rule, by
its terms, was limited to this particular proceeding:
This rule shall apply to any investigation or proceeding of the
Commission on Judicial Performance relating to any possible im-
proper conduct of any Justice of the Supreme Court of California
arising out of (1) any irregularities or delays in handling the Tan-
ner case, (2) any irregularities or delays in handling any other
case or cases pending before the Supreme Court prior to the elec-
tion of November 7, 1978, caused or instituted for the purpose of
delaying the filing of the Court's decision in any such case until
after the date of the election, and/or (3) any unauthorized disclo-
sure of confidential information regarding any of the above pend-
ing cases prior to the public release of the decision.14
Seth Hufste dtler, of the law firm of Beardsley, Hufstedtler
12. Judicial Counsel Resolution' (adopting CAL. R. CT. 902.5) reprinted in Tan & Aik-
man, supra note 5, at 42 (Appendix A). The relevant portion of the text of the resolution is
as follows:
"WHEREAS, a public inquiry into the actions of the Supreme Court in reaching a deci-
sion in the Tanner case -has been requested and widely supported, and
"WHEREAS, no opposition to such an inquiry has been expressed by the members of
that Court, and
"WHEREAS, the office of the Chief Justice has publicly expressed support of a public
inquiry,
"RESOLVED, that the request of the Chief Justice that there be 'an investigation of
the charge that the Supreme Court improperly deferred announcing a decision in the Tan-
ner case' by the Commission on Judicial Performance be acknowledged as action taken by
her in her capacity as Chief Justice.
"Further, that the designation of the Commission on Judicial Performance as the body
to conduct that investigation be approved."
13. CAL. R. CT. 902.5, quoted in Tan & Aikman, supra note 5, at 42 (Appendix A).
14. Judicial Counsel Resolution (adopting CAL. R. CT. 902.5) reprinted in Tan & Aik-
man, supra note 5, at 43 (Appendix A). /
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and Kemble, was retained as special counsel for the Commission.
Computed on an hourly basis, Hufstedtler's fee eventually
amounted to $418,935, plus almost $26,000 on reimbursable ex-
penses.15 During the prehearing investigation, each of the seven
justices was interviewed, as well as fifty-two past and present
members of the supreme court staff. The public hearing began on
June 18, 1979. Five members of the court, Chief Justice Bird, Jus-
tice Mathew D. Tobriner, Justice Frank K. Richardson, Justice
Wiley Manuel and Justice William P. Clark, were publicly ex-
amined before the proceedings were ordered closed by one of Cali-
fornia's intermediate courts of appeal as a result of a suit brought
by California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk.16
On October 18, 1979, a special ad hoc supreme court, consist-
ing of seven intermediate appellate judges chosen by lot, affirmed
the court of appeal, holding that the California Constitution re-
quires that judicial disciplinary investigations must be conducted
confidentially. The special court concluded
that in light of the history and purpose of article VI, section 18,
the limited scope of the Commission's authority to investigate ju-
dicial misconduct, the strong public policy in favor of confidential
investigations by the Commission, and the absence of any indica-
tion that the people of California intended to change the consti-
tutional requirement of confidentiality by revision of article VI in
1966, the Judicial Council has authority to adopt rules which pro-
vide for confidentiality but it does not have the power to author-
ize public investigations and hearings before the Commission.
... For this reason Justice Mosk cannot constitutionally be com-
pelled to testify at a public hearing before the Commission in
C.J.P. No. 3012.17
The hearings were closed, and in November of 1979, the Commis-
sion reported that the investigation had been terminated and that
"no formal charges [would] be filed against any Supreme Court
justice."1
15. Information received from a staff member of the California Commission on Judi-
cial Performance.
16. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979).
17. Id. at 499, 601 P.2d at 1047-48, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12 (footnote omitted).
18. California Comm'n on Judicial Performance, Report on Status and Announcement
of Results (Nov. 5, 1979), quoted in Tan & Aikman, supra note 5, at 7.
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Grounds for Discipline
The California Constitution provides that the Commission on
Judicial Performance may recommend censure or removal of a
judge for conduct that "constitutes wilful misconduct in office, per-
sistent failure or inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual
intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute."19 Under these standards, only the allegation of un-
authorized disclosure of information regarding pending cases was
worthy of investigation. That a chief justice of the California Su-
preme Court might have delayed the publication of an opinion for
a reasonable period of time, until after an election, is not, nor
should it be, a proper subject of inquiry by a judicial discipline
commission. If there is no 'excessive delay, the timing of an opinion
should not bring the judiciary into disrepute, even if it might con-
ceivably improve the election chances of a particular judge. As long
as a judge is required to enter the political arena and stand for
retention, it can be expected that, on occasion, the timing of judi-
cial decisions will be based on political considerations. Provided
that the decision itself is insulated from the political process, tim-
ing of an opinion fpor political purposes should not be a ground for
discipline.
At most, timing is a question which, like a judge's decisions,
may be considered by the voters in the election. If it were grounds
for judicial discipline, a judicial conduct commission would have a
plethora of allegations to consider before and after each election
campaign in which a judge was aggressively challenged. Indeed,
19. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (1849, amended 1976). Section 18 also contains other
disciplinary provisions, as well as a disability retirement provision. The ABA Standards,
supra note 2, at 29, provide that
"Grounds for discipline should include:
(a) Conviction of a felony;
(b) Willful misconduct in office;
(c) Willful misconduct which, although not related to judicial duties, brings the
judicial office into disrepute;
(d) Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or conduct unbecoming a
judicial officer, whether conduct in office or outside of judicial duties, that brings
the judicial office into disrepute;
(e) Any conduct that constitutes a violation of the codes of judicial conduct or
professional responsibility." Id.
See also Overton, Grounds for Judicial Discipline in the Context of Judicial Disciplinary
Commissions, 54 CH.-KEr L. REv. 59 (1977).
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considering the extreme pressures that can be brought to bear on a
judge seeking retention, it is questionable whether a judge should
be required to make a decision at a time when his or her political
survival may be at stake. A court should minimize the pressures in
a particular case so that the decision, when made, does not appear
to be the result of outside influences. A litigant is entitled to a
learned and dispassionate consideration of his case. A losing party
should not feel that his case was decided on the basis of public
opinion and media pressure, nor should he feel that the court was
taking pains to avoid the appearance of succumbing to outside
pressure. Judicial bravado, evidenced by handing down an unpopu-
lar opinion a few days before an election in which the judge may
lose his office, does not create confidence in the decision rendered.
It is interesting to note that during the Judicial Commission
hearings, it was revealed that the second Tanner decision was
"rushed through" and the opinion filed prior to the Commission
hearing so that it would not pose a problem during the investiga-
tion into Tanner .2o This is an example of timing an opinion in
response to factors that were foreign to the decision itself and
which vitally affected the members of the California Supreme
Court. 1 Yet, no allegations .of misconduct were made as to the tim-
ing of this opinion, nor should there have been. Except as to the
unauthorized disclosure problem, which was never truly developed,
the Commission should not have proceeded. There were no
grounds for the discipline of any justice of the California Supreme
Court in the delayed publication of the Tanner and Fox opinions.
Confidentiality of the Proceedings
Judicial discipline, like attorney discipline, is not imposed for
the purpose of punishment. As stated in the ABA Standards:22
The fundamental principle upon which these standards are based
is that the major purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish
20. Information obtained from video tapes of the Commission hearings.
21. People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979). On
rehearing, the court held that the "use a gun, go to prison" law was mandatory, reversing
the decision of the trial court. Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Richardson, Manuel and Moak, who had voted the other way in the first Tanner opinion.
Chief Justice Bird and Justices Tobriner and Newman concurred in part and dissented in
part.
22. See note 2 supra.
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judges but to protect the public and, thus, preserve the integrity
of the judicial process, maintain public confidence in the judici-
ary, and create a greater awareness of proper judicial behavior on
the part of judges themselves.23
Judicial discipline commissions, such as the California Com-
mission on Judicial Conduct, provide the public with an avenue
whereby perceived misconduct on the part of a judge can be ad-
dressed and corrected. Pursuant to the Constitution of the State of
California, 24 the California Rules of Court, which govern the pro-
ceedings of the Commission on Judicial Performance, require that
any preliminary or probable cause hearing be closed to the public
and the press. 25 In California, the proceedings are not made public
until the recommendations of the Commission are filed with the
state supreme court. The ABA Standards differ in that they pro-
vide that an investigation into alleged misconduct becomes public
after the "finding of probable cause," but before the formal hear-
ings.2 Both procedures, however, keep probable cause hearings
closed to the public.
Nevertheless, the California Commission on Judicial Perform-
ance, pursuant to their special rule, marched into the evening tele-
vision news to conduct a probable cause hearing. Internal operat-
ing procedures of the California Supreme Court were dragged into
public view; personal opinions, habits and prejudices of the mem-
bers of the supreme court were revealed and explored. The minu-
tiae of the deliberative process were unveiled and discussed, the
public entertained and titillated, and the California Supreme
Court extensively damaged. The California Judicial Council had
felt that "the requirement of confidentiality may, to the extent de-
termined by the Commission, be modified with respect to said pro-
ceeding. '' 27 But the Council was ill-advised in amending their rules
23. ABA Standards, supra note 2, at 14.
24. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(f) (1849, amended 1976).
25. CAL. R. CT. 902.
26. ABA Standards, supra note 2, at 33.
27. CAL. R. CT. 902.5 went on to say: "and, after completion of the investigation, a
public hearing shall be held and shall be publicly conducted. The public hearing shall in-
clude the right of all segments of the news media to be present and report the proceedings."
Evidently the Commission interpreted "shall" to be mandatory in the investigatory stage. A
more consistent and rational interpretation would have required a public hearing only after
charges had been filed following the usual confidential investigation. It may well be that the
Commission did not wish to take "the heat" by keeping the investigation closed until
charges had been filed. The Commission therefore took the tenuous position that they were
[Vol. 8:11
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to allow the Commission to dispense with confidentiality in the
probable cause stage; the Commission on Judicial Performance
should not otherwise have been required to go public as it did.
Justice Stanley Mosk has commented on the actions of the
Commission as follows:
The Commission, never before cast into the limelight, responded
with enthusiasm and, through appropriate channels had its rules
changed to provide for public investigative hearings, including ra-
dio and television coverage. Such open proceedings, prior to ac-
tual disciplinary recommendations to the supreme court itself,
were clearly contrary to state constitutional requirements of con-
fidentiality, but reason and restraint were swept aside by fear and
emotion.
From that point on, the media had a field day. The Commis-
sion ... permitted reports on corridor gossip among law clerks,
inquiries into intent, motivation, speculation, and it welcomed the
rankest type of hearsay, and hearsay upon hearsay. Questions by
Commission members such as these were not uncommon: Of a law
clerk witness, "What did Justice A tell you that Justice B said to
him during or after the court conference in which the case was
discussed?"
"What was the law clerk's demeanor when 'you asked him if
his judge's opinion was politically motivated?"
In the hearings, justices were called upon to discuss why their.
secretaries did not get carpeting and why one justice would not
speak with another justice unless a law clerk was present to take
notes; staff members were asked about conversations with news-
paper reporters; law clerks were grilled on why a particular foot-
note was inserted into an opinion; justices were cross-examined as
to why specific citations were included in their writings; and every
draft of an opinion, every intra-office memorandum and all court
records of an internal nature relating to a number of specific cases
were subpoenaed and offered in evidence in the public
proceedings.
The entire investigation became a media event that replaced
day-time soap operas, and, not surprisingly, television and the
press reveled with prurient interest in every juicy morsel relating
to internal court personality conflicts. 28
required to conduct a public investigation until the special California Supreme Court held
otherwise.
28. Remarks of Justice Stanley Mosk, Administrative Law Judges Symposium, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 1980).
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Because so many complaints are frivolous in nature, probable
cause hearings should remain confidential until such time as sub-
stantial grounds are found for a formal hearing. The purpose of
confidentiality is not to conceal evidence which shows misconduct
on the part of any judge. If such misconduct exists, this can be
revealed after probable cause has been found, or when the record
is filed with the supreme court. As the special California Supreme
Court stated:
The confidentiality of investigations and hearings by the Com-
mission is based on sound public policy. Confidentiality encour-
ages the filing of complaints and the willing participation of citi-
zens and witnesses by providing protection against possible
retaliation or recrimination. Confidentiality protects judges from
injury which might result from publication of unexamined and
unwarranted complaints by disgruntled litigants or their attor-
neys, or by political adversaries. Confidentiality of investigations
by the Commission preserves confidence in the judiciary as an in-
stitution by avoiding premature announcement of groundless
claims of judicial misconduct or disability. Confidentiality... is
essential to protecting the judge's constitutional right to a private
admonishment, if the circumstances so warrant. When removal or
retirement is justified by the charges, judges are more likely to
resign or retire voluntarily without the necessity of a formal pro-
ceeding if the publicity that would accompany such a proceeding
can thereby be avoided.29
Judge John H. Gillis and Elaine Fieldman have noted in regard to
the requirement of confidentiality in Michigan's system of judicial
discipline:
Investigatory confidentiality is required during this weeding out
process so that the judge is protected from frivolous attacks and
litigants and attorneys are encouraged to report their grievances
without fear of reprisal from the judge. If all grievances were pub-
licly announced, meritless complaints could have irreversible
ramifications. For example, a grievance made in bad faith might
be intentionally timed during the apex of a judge's election cam-
paign; thus, leaving no time before the election day to investigate
and communicate the truth. The mere allegation of impropriety
could have [disastrous] effects on the judge's reputation then and
in the future .... Public knowledge of a disciplinary investiga-
29. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474,491, 601 P.2d 1030, 1041-42, 159 CaL Rptr.
494, 505-06 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
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tion... often cloaks an ill-founded complaint with a veil of cred-
ibility regardless of an announcement by a disciplinary body that
the grievance was unfounded. Thus, confidential investigations
are necessary in order to: (1) protect the judge's reputation until
such time as a public disclosure is warranted; and (2) avoid bur-
dening such judges with defending against untruthful
allegations.30
If the California Commission on Judicial Performance had fol-
lowed existing rules and maintained confidentiality at the investi-
gative and probable cause stages, the California Supreme Court
and the California judicial system would have been spared great
embarrassment and harm. What is more important, public confi-
dence and respect for the California judicial system would not have
been unnecessarily eroded.
Internal Deliberative Processes
During both the public and the non-public hearings, members
of the court and court personnel were subjected to searching exam-
inations concerning the internal deliberative processes of the court.
The Commission probed three areas: discussions at the court's de-
cisional conferences, conversations between judges, and discussions
between a judge and his staff. A few examples of questions about
the discussions at the court's decisional conferences will serve to
illustrate this probing:
Q: Do you remember, Justice Manuel, what your announced po-
sition was, if any, .on the Tanner case at the time of the confer-
ence following argument?
A: At that time, I believe I indicated that I was doubtful. I
hadn't taken a strong position.
Q: ... With regard to the conference following argument on
February 6, do you remember whether or not there were any
other justices who were doubtful in stating their position?
A: My recollection is that the chief justice expressed her doubt-
fulness, and it's also my recollection and interpretation of what
Justice Newman indicated that he was doubtful. 31
30. Gillis & Fieldman, Michigan's Unitary System of Judicial Discipline: A Compari-
son with Illinois' Two-Tier Approach, 54 Cm.-KErr L. REv. 117, 120-21 (1977).
31. Reporter's Transcript at 3816-17, July 17, 1979.
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As to conversations with other justices regarding the Tanner case,
Mr. Hufstedtler examined Justice Manuel as follows:
Q: ... Did you have any discussions with Justice Clark about
his revised dissent prior to the time he circulated it on August
15?
A: Yes.
Q: More than one such conversation?
A: One that I can recall, only one.
Q: And where did that conversation take place?
A: I believe it took place in his chambers.
Q: Were just the two of you present?
A: Yes.
Q: And will you tell me please, as well as you can recall, what
the two of you said?
A: I'm not sure why I was in his chambers, but we were talking
about opinion writing, and strong language, and I indicated to
him at that time that with regard to Tanner, I had signed the
opinion, but I was a little bit concerned about what I considered
strong language in the opinion, and he indicated to me at that
time, and he said something to the effect that I need not worry
about that, because he was in the process of revising the opinion
and he would take care of my problem.32
Concerning the staff of the court, the following is an example of
the questioning:
Q: And as a member of her staff were you involved in the prepa-
ration of any of the papers or the workup of any of the case [Peo-
ple v. Caudillo] for the chief justice?
A: Yes. I was involved in the preparation of the calendar memo,
which at times is assigned to the chief justice's staff. Caudillo was
reassigned and the chief justice did not herself write the lead
opinion in Caudillo. It was reassigned to pro tern Justice
Jefferson.
Q: Now, at that time did that memorandum make any recom-
mendation to the chief justice as to whether the acts involved in
that case, the acts involved in the rape of that case constituted
great bodily injury?
A: Yes. It dealt with that issue.
32. Reporter's Transcript at 3829 and 3835, July 17, 1979.
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Q: What was the conclusion that the calendar memorandum ar-
rived at?
A: The conclusion in the calendar memo was that rape itself
would not constitute great bodily injury within the meaning of
the statute.
Q: Was that a conclusion in which you concurred?
A: Yes, eventually she concurred in that.
Q: Did you discuss the subject with her?
A: I can't recall the particular conversation that I had with her
on this matter.. . . my recollection is that she had some reserva-
tions about how the matter should be concluded .3
An appellate court speaks through its opinions, which are pub-
lished and are equally available to all who wish to learn the court's
view of the law in a particular fact situation. To require justices of
an appellate court to submit to questioning about subjective rea-
sons for their decisions and written opinions can only weaken the
force of the opinions themselves. The integrity and effectiveness of
the opinions of an appellate court will be unnecessarily weakened
if the deliberative and reasoning processes of the justices can be
subject to after-the-fact examination.
Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed concern that if, by the
filing of charges, appellate courts could be forced to respond re-
garding their decisional processes,
[J]udges everywhere will not only fear making rulings they think
the law requires when the rulings might prove unpopular or dis-
please those in power. They will fear as well the candid and vigor-
ous internal disagreements without which the judicial process
would be rendered vastly less thoughtful and ultimately less ef-
fective. Nor could collegiality or trust long survive in a court com-
posed of seven or nine strong-willed individuals once each judge
knew that a disgruntled or jealous colleague might initiate an in-
vestigation simply by leaking hints that an action by that judge
had been politically motivated.
These concerns plainly require preserving the sanctity of a
court's internal deliberations."
The thought processes of judges or other decisionmakers should
not be the subject of inquiry and examination. Justice Frankfurter,
33. Reporter's Transcript at 3480-83, July 13, 1979.
34. Tribe, Trying California's Judges on Television: Open Government or Judicial
Intimidation? 65 A.B.A.J. 1175, 1178 (1979).
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some forty years ago, stated that "[s]uch an examination of a judge
would be destructive of judicial responsibility. '3 5
I do not mean to imply that internal operating procedures of
an appellate court should be concealed from the public. These pro-
cedures should be a matter of public record. Some courts have
published their internal operating practices, and these publications
have been helpful in better understanding the court's operation. 6
But absent a strong showing of bad faith, improper behavior, fraud
or other extreme circumstances, the personal thoughts of a justice
and the conversational "honing" of opinions by judges in the deci-
sionmaking process should not be a subject of after-decision exam-
ination. The damage this can do to the free flow of ideas, to frank
and open discussion of difficult problems, and to the development
of new and beneficial law cannot be outweighed by the desire of
disgruntled litigants, the public and the press to find out what goes
on in the court's decisional conferences or in a judge's mind. The
need to compromise and accommodate different views in reaching
collegial decisions is healthy and appropriate. The exposure of the
process would tend to freeze and harden positions lest the judge
seem weak or unsure of himself, and this could destroy the value of
the appellate process. As Justice Mosk noted:
[O]nce administrative agencies or any non-judicial bodies are per-
mitted to inquire into internal functions of the judiciary-absent
articulable charges of corruption-the independence of the judici-
ary and its ability to function efficiently are gravely threatened.
There is no more pathetic sight than learned judges cringing in
fear of an aggressive investigative commission, the members of
which are pandering to the media. '3 7
Defense of the Judge
The fee received by Seth Hufstedtler and his firmss suggests
35. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1940). See also A. BicmKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROus BRANCH 215 (1962).
36. See, e.g., Internal Operating Procedures of the Florida Supreme Court, 1977;. In-
ternal Operating Practices, California Courts of Appeal, 1979; and Internal Operating Prac-
tices of the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon, 1979. See also articles by individual
judges: Cameron, Internal Operating Procedures of the Arizona Supreme Court, 17 Amiz. L.
REv. 643, (1976); Molinari, Decisionmaking Conference of the California Court of Appeal,
57 CAL. L. REV. 606 (1969).
37. Remarks of Justice Stanley Mosk, supra note 28.
38. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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the potentially staggering costs that may be incurred by a judge
who must defend himself before a judicial discipline commission.
The ABA Standards provide that the "cost of all proceedings
should be at public expense."3 9 However, the Commentary to the
ABA Standards points out that "[t]he expenses of the commission,
including staff salaries, its expert witnesses, mental or physical ex-
aminations it requests or directs, preparation of its documents, and
the service of process are all proper items for public expense. The
judge's attorney fees should not be at public expense." 40 The Stan-
dards further provide that a judge can only be reimbursed for the
cost of an expert witness in the event that he is exonerated. 41 The
drafters of the standards knew that the public would be loath to
provide attorney's fees for judges in disciplinary proceedings. As
Judge Peskoe commented:
The suggestion that counsel should be provided at public expense
was rejected by the drafters even where fees may mount up for
special reasons .because of the anticipated adverse public reaction.
Presently counsel is provided at public expense in most jurisdic-
tions only to indigents. Judges are certainly not viewed by the
public as indigents or anywhere near indigent. Besides, judicial
disciplinary proceedings cannot be equated with criminal
proceedings.42
Perhaps the Standards should be changed and some allowance
made to provide judges with reasonable attorney's fees for defend-
ing themselves in judicial disciplinary hearings. A judge who is liv-
ing on a limited salary can ill-afford to pay for legal representat-
tion. This is especially true when there is a "show trial" and a
"sky's the limit" policy as far as the investigating body's legal ex-
penses are concerned. In matters of this kind, it is not unreasona-
ble to ask that the state bear the expense of a proper defense for
the accused judge.
Conclusion
At the hearing Chief Justice Bird stated:
So it is with deep concern in terms of what we are doing histori-
39. ABA Standards, supra note 2, at 49....
40. Id.
41. Id. at 48.
42. Peskoe, supra note 3, at 164 (footnotes omitted).
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cally, as opposed to what we are doing for the moment with this
momentary investigation into these allegations, but what we are
laying for generations ahead as to what a body like this Commis-
sion can do in terms of an investigation in which any disgruntled
individual can go to a newspaper, purport to give inside informa-
tion and enough of the truth, perhaps a half-truth, to make an
entire lie, have that printed and then require a Commission of
this sort to have to begin an investigation. And in the process of
your attempting to do your duty you believe you must investigate
all the nooks and crannies.
... Mr. Hufstedtler at the beginning of this hearing indi-
cated that we are the most fragile branch, and that is true. We
are dealing with delicate china here and in some ways I feel that
we have thrown very delicate china into a laundrymat.43
Chief Justice Bird is correct in her assessment of the damage
that was inflicted on the California judiciary by the failure to fol-
low existing procedures. Because the charges were given extraordi-
nary publicity, they took on a substance they did not deserve. Be-
cause questions concerning the deliberative processes of the
California Supreme Court were allowed, the effectiveness of its de-
cisions was weakened. The fact that the Commission was willing to
incur large legal fees and expenses to conduct a show trial made it
almost impossible for the members of the court to adequately de-
fend or otherwise participate on an equal basis.
Major damage to the court resulted from the public nature of
the proceedings. Judges in our system of government occupy a dif-
ferent position from that held by members of the other two
branches of government. Judges must earn acceptance of their de-
cisions based upon the logic of their opinions and not upon the
personality of the judge. By bringing to the surface, in a public
hearing, the stresses and strains which underlie the decisionmaking
processes of the California Supreme Court, the personalities of the
justices became more important than the law they made. Personal-
ity disputes which affect the decisionmaking process can, if made
public, lead to disrespect for the judicial process and erode public
confidence in courts generally, not just the supreme court. The
failure of the individual members of the California Supreme Court
to recognize their responsibility to maintain respect for the institu-
43. Tan & Aikman, supra note 5, at 7 (quoting Justices' Reservations about Public
Inquiry).
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tion of the supreme court, and their lack of understanding of the
collegial function of an appellate court in arriving at a collective
judgment contributed to this problem.
In their desire to bask in the spotlight of public controversy,
the members of the Commission inflicted great damage upon an
institution they were supposed to protect. I have confidence that
this damage will not be permanent, but it is tragic that it had to
happen at all.

